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16 February 2010 
World Bank Urban Geography: 
Critical Commentary on the World Development Report 2009  
Reshaping Economic Geography  
 
Deborah Fahy Bryceson  
 
Over the last 25 years the World Bank has annually published reports on world economic 
development with wide-ranging themes. Two have showcased agriculture and rural 
development, but this is the first to place urban areas centre stage. Unlike the rural reports, 
which had copious references to concrete rural development problems and policies, this 
year’s WDR is a celebration of the theoretical concept of agglomeration, and its influence in 
creating population aggregations in urban settlements. The Report introduces and 
popularizes what is now known as the ‘new economic geography’ (NEG). This is a relatively 
recently established branch of economics which has gained salience with the award of this 
year’s Nobel prize to one of its leading theorists, Paul Krugman. NEG draws heavily on 
geography concepts but without geographers’ qualifications, reservations and provisos. 
Much of the declining sway of quantitative geography models in the 1980s and 1990s came 
from the realization that central place theory offered a fairly narrow window on the 
complicated dynamics of urban demographic and economic change. While drawing on 
geography concepts, this is a report written by economists, which ignores previous 
quantitative economic geographers’ work on urban agglomeration. Agglomeration is viewed 
as an imperative for development and, most significantly, an ‘engine of growth’, inverting 
past World Bank and western aid agency thinking which saw ‘urban bias’ as a severe drain 
on development. Why the change of mind?  
First, it is estimated that the majority of the world’s population are now urban. Thus, the 
World Bank is giving urbanization long overdue attention. Second, NEG economists argue 
that the concept of agglomeration provides a major analytical leap forward in economics 
resolving contradictions in classic competitive labour market models, which assumed 
constant returns to scale. NEG economists’ awareness of scalar economies yielding higher 
returns from concentrated supplies of labour and capital have now, according to the WDR: 
‘diminished the disconnect between research and the real world’ (p.126) and the often false 
dichotomy between internal and external economies (p.136). Claims that the NEG bridges 
the theoretical world of economists and real world of policy makers could be construed as an 
oblique way of saying that economic models hitherto were over-simplistic. But proof of the 
agglomeration concept’s revolutionary insights is weakened by the use of restricted case 
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evidence primarily from industrialized countries especially the United States where patterns 
are likely to be swayed just as much by corporate organizational structure as by urban 
location criteria per se.  
It is jarring to see the World Bank pendulum of thought swing so radically from its earlier 
negative urban bias position. Agglomeration is posited as an inherent good, optimizing 
productivity, development and eventually welfare. Population migration and concentration 
are deemed markers of progress along the developmental path, assuming the hidden hand 
of the market propels urban agglomeration and should be given full expression without 
impediment: ‘So city administrators are well advised to learn what their city does, and to help 
it do this better, rather than try to change the course of their city’s destiny. Planners and 
policymakers should see their role as prudent managers of a portfolio of places, to get the 
most from agglomeration economies’ (WDR09, 128). Their role is to ‘relax the constraints 
generated by the congestion and overcrowding of land and resources so that the benefits of 
agglomeration can be maximized’ (WDR09, 144). 
A ‘3-D approach’ referring to the main themes density (population agglomeration, urban 
areas), distance (migration, transport) and division (specialization, borders, social conflict) 
are didactically explained before schematically linking them to policy trajectories. Stress is 
placed on the tendency for scale economies to amplify with density and attenuate with 
distance. Analytical parts of the report read like an undergraduate textbook in NEG.  
For those not sharing in the euphoria of a disciplinary breakthrough in economics, there is, 
however, a significant departure from previous World Development reports’ tendency to 
advance simple dictums and blanket policies recommendations. In their place, multiple 
policy options are offered, mechanistically derived but nonetheless affording some choice of 
action related to a country’s degree of densification and extent of economic and social 
divisions, stage of the urban agglomeration process. In areas of incipient urbanization the 
recommendation is one-dimensional: ‘build density with spatially blind institutions’. In other 
words, implement the millennium development goals and make no allowance for additional 
infrastructural or service investment in incipient settlements. Small and secondary towns 
representing intermediate urbanization are seen as sufficiently developed to warrant a two-
dimensional policy approach involving investment in connective infrastructure such as roads, 
rail, and communications. It is only in settlements of advanced urbanization that three-
dimensional investment involving spatially targeted investment is contemplated to ‘address 
economic and social divisions’ due to slums and other problematic circumstances. 
This amounts to a neat package of seemingly pragmatic policies to contend with the ‘reality 
of growth and development’ albeit grossly over-simplified, advocating ‘spatially blind’ policies 
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in most developing countries where urbanization levels are relatively low. The schema 
presupposes a market-driven growth trajectory through which lagging regions, permeated 
with poverty and inequality, are bound to appear. Migration rather than targeted efforts to 
even out development are prescribed as the remedy. ‘Geographic targeting’ is considered to 
be a wasteful impediment to progress.  
Apart from the blind belief in laissez-faire markets applied to countries regardless of their 
spatial planning priorities, this Report is, in effect, advocating large-scale urban migration to 
purportedly dynamic urban centres without due consideration of the environmental and 
social consequences that follow. Next year’s WDR will deal with environmental issues in 
general but there is no excuse for skating over the likely social distress and political 
instability arising from accelerating urban growth in the absence of policies directed at 
providing checks and balances. The Report testifies to the World Bank’s continuing inability 
to integrate their economic growth-optimizing goals with the socio-political reality of widening 
economic differentiation embedded in single-minded going-for-growth strategies. Urban 
planners’ and policymakers’ concern about rapid urban growth is seen as ‘a misplaced 
preoccupation with size, not function’ (WDR09, 142). The multi-dimensional nature of urban 
areas as human settlements is lost on the NEG zealots. ‘…Cities and towns should be seen 
as market agents, just like firms and farms, serving market needs’ (WDR09, 145). The 
economic reductionism of the WDR09 borders on the ridiculous if it were not for the power of 
the World Bank recommending policies that could be hazardous in a period of global climate 
change, economic upheaval and rising political tension in many parts of the developing 
world. Under the prevailing circumstances, the myopia of the WDR09 agglomeration fetish is 
worryingly irresponsible.  
Since the early 1980s the developing world, particularly in Sub Saharan Africa, has 
experienced the direct intervention of the World Bank in national policy formulation. 
Meanwhile the annual World Development reports have set the fashion, authoritatively 
presenting the latest economic development theories in technocratic terminology regardless 
of the concrete complexities of the lived experiences of populations in developing countries. 
Many of the World Bank’s past analytical constructs are now disregarded in development 
studies, and sometimes repudiated by former World Bank personnel (Stiglitz 2003), yet the 
consequences of World Bank implementation of the misguided policies arising from their 
latest orthodoxies persist, continuing to adversely affect the economic competitiveness and 
welfare of the recipient populations in the developing world. 
A committee of economists led by the eminent Angus Deaton from Princeton University 
evaluated the World Bank in 2006, challenging the institution’s reputation as the world’s 
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knowledge bank, referring to its habit of taking: ‘new and untested results as hard evidence 
that its preferred policies work’. The Deaton report singled out the flagship Wars as a 
medium through which advocacy of the World Bank’s favoured policy recommendations 
sometimes takes precedence over balanced analysis. This year’s WDR falls squarely in this 
category. Further we need to question the World Bank’s lack of accountability to people in 
the developing world who experience the adverse consequences of implementing their latest 
WDR policy axioms. The World Bank insists on democratic governance in national 
government in developing countries but they successfully evade these principles being 
applied to them in their role as the international governor of development policy. Something 
is very askew. Under these circumstances, perhaps it is fortuitous that the urban sector has 
been lucky to escape WDR analytical attention until the present. 
This and each of the regional and thematic commentaries that follow represent the views of 
the author rather than a shared perspective.  
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World Development Report 2009 and Latin American Urbanization 
Katherine V. Gough  
Urbanization in the global South has for too long been cast in a negative light by 
international and national development agencies. This is despite the strong correlation 
between levels of urbanization and economic growth. The positive slant taken by the World 
Development Report 2009 (WDR) on urbanization is thus most welcome. As the UNFPA 
2007 State of the World Population Report, subtitled ‘Unleashing the potential of urban 
growth’, similarly highlighted, there are many positive aspects of urbanization including 
economic, social, cultural and environmental. The claims of the WDR regarding urbanization 
and economic development, however, are far from unproblematic when considered from a 
Latin American perspective. This commentary is divided into three parts corresponding with 
the tripartite division of the report, in each case focussing on the first chapter i.e. the 
chapters on ‘Density’,  ‘Scale economies and agglomeration’, and ‘Concentration without 
congestion’.  
 
Part 1 The facts 
The WDR claims that density increases with urbanization, rapidly at first and then more 
slowly. Although living standards initially diverge between areas of different density, later 
they converge and ‘Even within cities, densely populated slums amid formal settlements, the 
differences slowly disappear with development’ (WDR09, 49). Although density is defined as 
an ‘economic mass or output generated on a unit of land’ (WDR09, 49) the authors have a 
tendency to slide between using density in relation to the economy and density of population 
(place) which confuses their argument. Leaving this aside, if we turn to the USA, one of the 
countries most frequently drawn upon in the report, the claim that ‘within-urban disparities in 
welfare narrow with development’ (WDR09, 49) clearly does not hold. In Latin America, the 
overriding trend in cities is for increasing, not decreasing inequalities and associated rising 
socio-spatial segregation.  
Income inequality in Latin American cities has increased significantly in recent decades. As 
Janice Perlman (2004, 30) has shown, building on detailed ethnographic work in Brazilian 
favelas, ‘while the poor have improved their standing in absolute terms they have lost 
ground relative to the rest of the population’. Rather than inequalities disappearing with 
growth, Latin American cities are characterised by increased spatial segregation with the 
rich having an increased ability to segregate themselves from the poor. Gated communities, 
where fences, gates and armed guards mark spatial segregation, and in the large Latin 
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American metropolises even fenced cities housing up to 50,000 people, have emerged. As 
Axel Borsdorf et al. (2007, 366) argue, ‘These residential spaces form a central element of 
the new model of the space organization of the Latin American cities … and are one 
contemporary expression of the inequality and exclusion that have characterized the 
residential areas of the Latin American cities from their initial formation.’  
 
One of the driving forces behind this increased segregation is the rising fear of violence, 
which is linked to the increasing inequality. Urban violence is central to understanding 
urbanization as it not only acts as a considerable barrier to development, but the 
development process itself is instrumental in both producing and shaping new forms of 
urban violence (Winton 2004). As Caroline Moser (2004) has argued, urban space in Latin 
America is being reorganized in response to two interrelated issues: the heightened levels of 
crime and violence, and the lack of confidence in the state’s capacity to provide effective 
police security resulting in socio-spatial exclusion and segregation. This totally contradicts 
the image of increasing harmony projected by the report. 
 
Part 2 The insights 
Drawing on the concepts promoted by the ‘new economic geography’ approach, the WDR 
focuses on benefits of scale economies and agglomeration focussing almost exclusively on 
formal urban economies. The claim picked up on here is that ‘Among mature industries the 
persistence in employment patterns across cities is high over time’ (WDR09, 139). This 
clearly does not apply to most Latin American cities, which are characterised by an 
increasing informalization of the economy with consequent implications for the labour 
market. Neoliberalism, with its associated policies of liberalization, privatization, and 
deregulation, has resulted in deindustrialization and the reorganization and relocation of 
production and consumption activities. This has transformed the nature of work and 
increased the polarization in occupational structure and incomes with profound 
consequences for social and economic organisation (Roberts 2005).   
As in other parts of the world, the labour force has grown at a faster rate than formal 
employment resulting in 80 percent of job creation in Latin America being in the informal 
economy during the 1980s and 1990s (Tokman 2001 cited in Biles 2008). Drawing on 
studies conducted in Buenos Aires, Mexico City, Montevideo and Santiago, Bryan Roberts 
(2005) shows how the situation of the economically active population deteriorated during the 
1990s with vulnerability to poverty increasing correspondingly. Women in particular have 
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more insecure working conditions today than several decades ago (Perlman 2004). Latin 
American cities are characterised as having: reduced public sector employment, increased 
outsourcing and subcontracting, more precarious ‘flexible’ employment, increased 
participation of women in the workforce, and higher rates of underemployment and 
unemployment (Biles 2008). The powerful drivers for urban development are thus ‘economic 
transformation, deregulation, a retreat of the state, weakening of urban planning, but also 
the rise of (internationally organised) crime and  … the perception of vulnerability by the 
citizens’ (Borsdorf et al. 2007). This is a far cry from the picture of urban economies 
presented in the report. 
 
Part 3 The policy framework 
The WDR has the tendency to be highly selective in its use of supporting evidence, both 
contemporary and historical (Rigg et al. 2009). In relation to its housing policy proposals, 
Costa Rica is heralded as being a ‘model for other developing countries’ (WDR09, 214). 
Whilst not denying that countries can learn from each others’ experiences, no policy can be 
used as a blueprint for another; as is argued elsewhere in the report, place matters. The 
successful policies named in relation to dealing with low-income housing are taken from 
Sweden and the USA in the 1930s-1970s, which entailed demolishing and building 
replacement homes. However, not only can the very differing situations of Sweden and the 
USA not be transferred to Latin American cities today, there is a real danger of lumping all 
informal housing together under the label of ‘slums’ (see Gilbert 2007 - whose dislike of the 
return of the term ‘slum’ I share). As has long been reported for Latin America, dating back 
to the pioneering work of John Turner in the 1960s and 1970s, housing in informal 
settlements tends to be consolidated over the years and is often a solution rather than the 
problem.  
In the WDR’s policy proposals relating to slums, the ‘correct approach’ is seen as being 
‘integration of slums into the broader urban economy’ (WDR09, 227). Here again there is a 
slippage between economy and place, but the overall sentiment is shared, as are proposals 
for settlement upgrading. However, the authors continue by proposing that ‘if the problem is 
spatial inefficiency, steps to improve land use efficiency and compensate slum dwellers for 
disruptions to their livelihoods probably should take precedence’ (WDR09, 227-228). This 
provides a carte blanche for governments to remove informal settlements, the severe 
consequences of which for their inhabitants have been demonstrated countless times 
before.  
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To conclude, whilst the highlighting of some of the positive aspects of urbanization by the 
WDR is applauded, there are serious concerns regarding the facts, insights and policy 
recommendations it contains. The deliberate omission of any analysis of the social effects of 
a changing economic geography (as stated on page 34) results in central aspects of 
urbanization, including rising violence and the associated socio-spatial exclusion and 
segregation being overlooked. The misleading representation of the urban economy results 
in an incorrect analysis of the underlying processes and nature of urbanization. Not 
surprisingly then, and most worryingly, the policy suggestions are highly problematic and 
potentially harmful. 
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World Development Report and Asian Urbanization 
 
Jonathan Rigg  
 
WDR2009 contains a good deal of discussion of Asian urbanization and agglomeration. 
Broadly speaking, the experience of Asia is presented as positive and worthy of emulation. 
To support this, there is detailed, adroit and sometimes finely-crafted discussion from the 
world city of Singapore through to transport in Bangkok, rural-urban integration in China, and 
city-to-city connectivities in Japan. The Report is, at first glance, impressively broad in its 
coverage of Asian countries and cases. 
 
For many geographers, however, the Report also embraces an uncomfortable, albeit hidden, 
teleology that, in summary, takes it for granted that reducing distance, easing division and 
encouraging density will deliver economic growth and, therefore, development. In making its 
case, the Report adopts three approaches which are regarded here as problematic. First of 
all, the Report generally avoids examples and evidence that might challenge the argument 
the Report seeks to make; second, the Report narrows the focus of concern to the 
economics of concentration (urbanization), and in large part fails to confront the social and 
economic implications and outcomes of the processes that are addressed; and third, the 
Report does not sufficiently entertain the possibility that urbanization processes and 
transitions are importantly different between countries, regions and cases.   
 
Perhaps the most striking statement in the whole report is contained in a box with the title, 
‘What this report is not about’: ‘To keep the Report focused, several important aspects of the 
spatial transformations do not get the attention they would in a fuller study. The main 
aspects not considered – except when emphasizing or qualifying the most important 
messages – are the social and environmental effects of a changing economic geography’ 
(WDR09: 34 [emphasis in original]). This means that cities tend to be portrayed in the Report 
as spaces of economic activity which generate growth, create wealth and reduce poverty. 
The implication seems to be that social and environmental effects are distractions, rather 
than central elements in building an understanding of what shapes cities beyond economic 
forces on the one hand, and what effects city growth and agglomeration economies have on 
the other. 
 
A more inclusive vision would, for example, have done more to explore the manner in which 
rural and urban poverty and prosperity are co-constituted; it would have considered the 
effects of increasing levels of mobility as households become divided over space; and it 
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would have been more explicit in its portrayal of the plight of urban migrant workers. Instead 
the report provides a Panglossian vision of agglomeration economies in which migration is 
seen as a positive force for change. Singapore, Shenzhen and Sriperumbudur ‘show how 
scale economies in production, movements of labor and capital, and falling transport costs 
interact to produce rapid economic growth in cities and countries both large and small’. 
‘These’, the Report goes on to state, ‘are the engine of any economy’ (WDR09, 14). The 
migration of millions of rural Chinese to the coastal provinces is presented in the report as a 
positive process, resulting in the matter-of-fact statement that ‘Governments should facilitate 
labor mobility’ (WDR09, 18). 
 
The result is that the authors of the Report feel able to make blanket assertions: ‘Are the 
policy messages of this Report anti-rural? No’ (WDR09, 200). The ‘rule’ apparently, ‘is 
symbiosis’ when it comes to relations between rural villages and different urban settlement 
types. This statement conveniently overlooks, for example, the literature on urban bias and 
the debate over the virtuous cycle of rural-urban relations. To be sure, both debates are still 
very much alive; with regard to urban bias, Corbridge and Jones note that while ‘academics 
may be notorious for sitting on the fence…there is no case for opting for the urban bias 
thesis or its ‘opposite’ in the round and in all respects’ (2005, 30). They go on to warn 
against forms ‘of politics or public policy that steamroller over local realities in the name of 
theoretical purity…’ (2005, 30). In this connection, the Report has three limitations: it limits 
its span of concern, largely, to the economic and gives the impression of viewing the social 
and environmental as merely incidental; it does not go far enough in looking for the links 
between urban and rural people, spaces and activities; and it eschews contrary views and 
evidence. 
 
In addition to narrowing its object of concern fairly squarely to economics, the Report also 
provide a universalist account of urban transitions. The possibility that urban transitions in 
various parts of the world may be importantly different is not seriously considered. For Grant 
and Nijman (2002), their study of cross-continental urban comparison ‘shows that the 
economic geography of present-day cities in the less-developed world is fundamentally 
different from that of ‘Third World cities’ and from globalizing cities in the West’ (2002, 328 
[emphasis in original]). 
 
The necessity to consider the possibility of difference is particularly apposite when it comes 
to Asia because there has been a rich debate over the specificities of Asian urbanization 
processes. In a recent study of cities and urbanization in China, the authors conclude that 
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‘the Chinese urban experience will lead to new ways of thinking about the urbanization 
process…’ (McGee et al. 2007, 199). That possibility is not present here. 
 
Because of the restricted way in which the Report selects and sieves its evidence, Chapter 7 
on ‘Concentration without congestion: managing an integrated portfolio of places’ ignores 
the extensive literature on Asian extended metropolitan regions (EMRs) initiated by the 
geographer Terry McGee (McGee 1989, 1991, 2003, McGee and Greenberg 1992, Koppel 
1991, Jones 1997, Webster 2005). This is all the more surprising because McGee and his 
followers’ work specifically addresses many of the spatial aspects of integration and 
interaction which the Report seeks to illuminate. Moreover, it does so in a way that might 
have injected more of a sense of nuance and contingency into the discussion. McGee, for 
example, critiques the way in which technology has become the scaffold for understanding 
change in Southeast Asian cities, ‘lead[ing] to a distorted view of Southeast Asian 
development, in which the roles of state and local actors are subordinated to the global 
impact’ (McGee 2007: 278). ‘My problem’, McGee writes, with such ‘approaches is that they 
are too one-dimensional and too unidirectional’ (2007, 278).  
 
What does this mean? It means that certain spaces of activity (the interstitial urban [and 
rural] spaces that are not easily measured and captured), certain processes (those that fall 
outside of the ambit of normal study), certain interactions (as noted above), and certain 
people (the poor, the marginalised, the uncounted, the unrecorded) become pushed to one 
side. The framing of economic geography that is adopted in WDR09 in which the economic 
takes precedent over the non-economic, the statistical over the ‘anecdotal’, the technical and 
the instrumental over the oral and the informal, and the expert over the non-expert plays a 
significant role in shaping the views and positions that are presented. It is true, of course, 
that all research has to make choices; but recognising the influence of these choices is 
critical. At the extreme, framings can create the justification for policy interventions that may 
be inimical to the interests of certain groups – who are usually the poor, the powerless, the 
invisible and the uncounted. It is striking how far this report differs in its tone and philosophy 
from WDR2000/01 ‘Attacking poverty’ which privileges the personal, the anecdotal, the 
participatory and the local (World Bank 2000).  
 
This is not to suggest that the World Bank in general and the authors of the Report in 
particular are not cognisant of inequality, but rather to note the way in which the approach 
adopted in the Report inexorably leads towards a set of positions. The overview, for 
example, states: 
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‘Concern for these intersecting 3 billion [poorest and most vulnerable] sometimes comes 
with the prescription that economic growth must be made more spatially balanced. The 
growth of cities must be controlled. Rural-urban gaps in wealth must be reduced quickly. 
Lagging areas and provinces distant from domestic and world markets must be sustained 
through territorial development programs that bring jobs to the people living there. … 
World Development Report 2009 has a different message: economic growth is seldom 
balanced. Efforts to spread it prematurely will jeopardize progress’ (WDR09, 5-6). 
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World Development Report 2009 and Sub-Saharan African Urbanization: 
Ignoring African Exceptionalism 
 
Deborah Fahy Bryceson  
The WDR09 adopts a conventional interpretation of urbanization, associating it with 
industrialization. This is a reasonably valid assumption for Asia at present and Latin America 
in the past but it has never been a significant factor in African urbanization. Africa’s 
industrialization was fostered by nationalist government support for import-substitution 
industries in the immediate aftermath of the national independence era of the 1960s and 
early 1970s. African industrial development had yet to take off before the oil crises of the 
1970s struck. Structural adjustment and economic liberalization policies eroded African 
industrial viability. By the 1990s most countries’ urban industrial sectors had become 
inconsequential.  
Nonetheless, Sub-Saharan Africa has experienced an exceptionally strong urbanization 
trend over the last three decades, not generally associated with economic growth or 
industrialization (Bryceson 2006). In fact, the continent has been gripped by economic 
malaise, despite western donor agencies’ concentrated aid expenditure and the World 
Bank’s dominating influence on national economic policy formulation. African urbanization 
trends directly contradict NEG theory, which associates urban agglomeration with economic 
growth. UN Habitat (2008, 106) describes African urbanization as a ‘widespread poverty-
driven economic survival strategy’. How can Africa’s rapid urban growth in the face of 
deepening poverty be explained?  
The WDR 09 tries to sidestep the yawning gap between theory and reality by casting doubt 
on African urban population statistics and reducing the sample for their analysis of 
correlation between urban growth and industrialization to a mere 10 countries out of over 50 
(WDR09, 59). On the basis of this cosseted sample, they claim there is evidence for ‘Africa’s 
urbanization reflect[ing] industrialization’ and economic growth – in direct contradiction to 
UN-Habitat’s (2008) experienced eye assessing the nature of African urban growth. By 
avoiding citation of data that would undermine the explanatory power of NEG agglomeration 
theory, the Report deflects the reader’s attention from the real causes of rapid urbanization 
in Africa (Bryceson 2002).  
The reliability of African urban population data differs from country to country. What is readily 
apparent is that the rural percentage of national populations is, as acknowledged in last 
year’s WDR08, declining. Africa is deagrarianizing and people are seeking non-agricultural 
livelihoods in a variety of places and at various rungs of the urban hierarchy. The rates at 
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which they are doing so vary from country to country, but they have been generally high for 
the last three decades. Given the depressed state of peasant agriculture, it is unlikely this 
trend will change until countries reach the point at which their countryside has aged and 
rural areas become underpopulated. 
In the Report, the ‘drivers of urbanization’ are conceptualized as ‘the market forces of 
agglomeration, migration and specialization - and the policies that help or hinder them’ 
(WDR09, 158). It is pertinent to consider the policy trajectory in Sub-Saharan Africa in this 
regard. In the 1970s, African nation-states’ agrarian economies were crippled by rising fuel 
costs that undermined the competitiveness of their agricultural exports and caused them to 
fall heavily into debt. The WDR09 stresses the significance of the historical decline in global 
transport costs for agglomeration tendencies but, while noting the continent’s relatively high 
transport costs, it does not acknowledge the structural dislocation of African national 
economies connected with the sudden oil price rises of the 1970s. Since then Sub-Saharan 
African economic policy formulation has been subject to western international financial 
institutions and donor agencies’ aid conditionality. African sovereignty in national economic 
policy-making has yet to be regained, with the exception of South Africa and Botswana 
whose solvency and middle-income country status have afforded them the scope to set their 
own policies. African peasant agriculture, which had absorbed the efforts of the majority of 
the population in almost all countries, deteriorated under structural adjustment’s lack of 
investment in it and economic liberalization policies which exposed a then weakened 
peasant agricultural sector to the rigours of world competition.  
In Sub-Saharan Africa, migration has driven the expansion of cities, but it is the ‘push’ of 
rural instead of the ‘pull’ of urban areas that has dominated. Agrarian involution rather than 
rising productivity in urban settlements has spurred African urban migration. The dominant 
tendency within rural and urban areas of Africa has been economic diversification not 
specialization, in response to the exceptionally high-risk environment that producers have 
faced. African urban areas, relative to other urbanized parts of the world, do not evince high 
levels of economic specialization. The burgeoning literature on African ‘urban agriculture’ is 
indicative of the subsistence nature of large spheres of urban economic activities (Foeken 
2006, Smith 1999). 
Most migrants entering the urban informal sector engage in low-income earning trade and 
service sector work and find makeshift housing in the extensive slum areas of African cities, 
migrating from rural home areas where income-earning prospects are even more meagre. 
Their aggregation in cities represents a concentration of poverty rather than productivity. The 
WDR09 averts confronting the fact that urbanization in labour-abundant, capital-deficient 
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areas will not generate the same economic dynamism as in countries where labour and 
capital assets are more balanced. 
African countries now have a broad range of urban settlement sizes from rapidly growing 
rural mining settlements that become towns in form and function over the space of months to 
large megacities including Johannesburg, Luanda, Kinshasa and Lagos. Luanda has been 
growing at over 6 per cent per annum. It is anticipated that by 2015, Kinshasa and Lagos will 
have entered the league of top 20 largest cities in the world at 17th and 19th places 
respectively (UN-Habitat 2008, 6).  
Regardless of the enormous spectrum of urban sizes and historical specificities of African 
urban settlements, the WDR09 reduces urban diversity into a mechanical policy matrix 
based on scale (level of agglomeration) and changing ‘dimension’, offering a staged 
progression of policies as urban scale increases, reserving urban investment policies 
primarily for high-density cities. This is seen as logical, leaving the market to find optimal 
urban sites for private investment and determine the economically viable size of cities. The 
WDR09 advocates avoidance of spatial policy intervention through the administration of 
‘spatially blind’ policies where development investment of basic service infrastructure, e.g. 
health care, education, water provisioning in line with the millennium development goals is 
generalized regardless of the presence of rural or urban populations. This approach does 
not take account of: 1) the exceptionally rapid rate of urban growth in many African 
cities/countries, 2) the specific resource constraints or opportunities of incipient and 
intermediate cities, and 3) the growing stimulus of mining in African urban development 
which poses special environmental and social problems. Mining settlements can grow very 
rapidly from small, deep rural to urban agglomerations of considerable size (Bryceson and 
Yankson 2009). 
The reality is that infrastructure provisioning is not uniform over space nor between rural and 
urban areas. Assuming that the market determines city location and rates of growth neutrally 
in the absence of powerful vested interests masks the inequities embedded in urbanization 
as a political process, and is likely to fuel rather than temper political instability and spatial 
welfare imbalances further. The economic dynamism of incipient urban settlements is 
usually accompanied by extreme wealth differentiating tendencies and potential discord. 
Governments cannot afford to ignore such settlements in their spatial policy formulation 
despite their relatively small size. Furthermore, at all scales of urban agglomeration, the 
complex challenges of ethnic relations cannot be overlooked in a continent where the 
plurality of ethnic groups is marked and sometimes prone to violence.  
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The WDR09’s laissez-faire approach to urban agglomeration discounts the urgency of 
African governments at local, municipal, regional and national level having a vision of the 
desired direction of urban change with informed and flexible plans. By contrast, African 
urban migrants have a vision and high expectations spurred by their dissatisfaction with rural 
conditions. The major governance problem for African states and local governments is that 
their urban expectations and search for alternative livelihoods to rural farming are frequently 
not secured in the city.  
Several undesirable trends are likely to coalesce. Unplanned urban growth has no feedback 
mechanisms. Urban growth becomes encrusted with the economic disappointment and 
social tension of expanding, spatially concentrated populations. Insufficient urban 
infrastructure and services leads to entrenched class bias in service provisioning. Adverse 
environmental outcomes associated with unplanned urbanization proliferate causing hazards 
to urban residents. Meanwhile energy expenditure levels climb as growing numbers adopt 
an urban lifestyle. Transport gridlock looms in the absence of offsetting measures. Rising 
unemployment levels feeds the proliferation of slums and crime. Economic frustration and 
social discord emerges that Africa’s weak nation-states cannot contain.  
Increasingly African political strife and civil war centres on cities. Witness the sudden 
outbreak of ethnic conflict in Kenya’s urban slums after the country’s national elections in 
January 2008. And then there is Mogadishu where unprecedented urban migration fuelled 
by rural distress and famine during the 1980s was the prelude to a civil war that has 
simmered and then vigorously boiled on and off to the present with disastrous loss to human 
life, urban civility and the undermining of the Somali nation-state.  
The WDR09’s enthusiasm for the economic invigoration of urbanization lacks an 
appreciation of the cultural, social and political forces that are unleashed by rapid 
urbanization in Sub-Saharan Africa. Without attempts at balancing state, market and 
community efforts to ensure socially harmonious and politically viable urbanization at all 
stages of the process in Sub Saharan Africa, it is inevitable that urban agglomeration will 
generate relatively more economic misery than growth for the continent.  
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Agglomeration, migration and the geographical concentration of labour 
 
Jytte Agergaard 
 
‘Labor mobility and voluntary migration for economic gain are the human side 
of the agglomeration story’ (p. 158) 
 
At the heart of the WDR’s concept of agglomeration is density of population and economic 
activity, and in order to secure population density, mobility of capital, and resources, 
people’s migration is essential. Factor mobility issues are discussed in Chapters 5 and 6 of 
the Report. Chapter 5 focuses on the relationship between economic growth and labour 
mobility, highlighting how the concentration of economic activity is stimulated by migrants. 
The subsequent chapter concentrates on economic and material flows and how economic 
activities are stimulated by the changing landscape of connectivity in relation to decreasing 
transportation costs and increasing communication facilities (what geographers normally 
refer to as ‘time-space compression’, cf. Harvey 1990). While Chapter 5 advocates removal 
of barriers to internal and international migration of labour, Chapter 6 argues for 
infrastructural investments, liberalization of transport in order to lower transport costs, and 
removal of other trade barriers in accordance with the WTO’s latest suggestions for policy 
reform (WDR09, 188). 
Migration researchers, not least the ones concerned with migration and mobility in the global 
South, have long argued for a more positive interpretation of internal migration 
acknowledging that people are increasingly living mobile lives, and that households’ 
livelihoods span rural and urban space (rural-urban linkages). For example, Robin Cohen 
puts forward a cogent pro-migration position in his book, Migration and its enemies (2006). 
The WDR’s focus and positive attitude towards migration and migrants is to be welcomed. 
However, not all migration is interpreted as positive. In making a distinction between ‘good’ 
and ‘bad’ migration, the WDR is operating with two main dichotomies: the first being 
between skilled and un-skilled migrants; and the second between migration for economic 
reasons and migration to improve access to public services. The WDR09 views positive 
migration as the migration of skilled migrants moving for economic reasons internally to 
urban areas, part of the national agglomeration processes that will provide ‘knowledge 
spillovers’ and investments in human capital (education). On the other hand, if the same 
migrants move overseas to the benefit of other nations’ agglomeration, this mobility is less 
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positive and risks loss of human capital. When it comes to unskilled migrants their mobility to 
agglomerations within the country is interpreted as mainly negative because they cannot 
partake effectively in the knowledge spillovers. However if they cross borders and remit 
earnings to their home community, their mobility is considered worthwhile:  ‘the policy 
challenge is not how to keep households from moving, but how to keep them moving for the 
wrong reasons’ (WDR09, 147). 
The theoretical construction behind this valuation of migration and mobility is Lucas Jr.’s re-
working of Arthur Lewis’s two-sector model (1958), which assumes that due to comparative 
labour costs, labour will flow from the subsistence sector in undeveloped economies to the 
modern sector in the developed economies. In Lucas Jr.’s version (1988, 2004), Lewis’ work 
from the 1950s is combined with later growth theory and focus on urban agglomeration 
economies. While most commentators would accept that differences in size and content of 
economies impact on the direction of migration flows, the suggestion that this economic 
model can inform us about who moves and who stays behind is much more problematic. 
The WDR09’s explanation of why current trends in migration and mobility do not follow 
Lewis’s and Lucas Jr.’s theoretical insights is that the ‘market’ for migration is imperfect: 
governments impose barriers to free mobility, and the transport sector does not function 
effectively. While, is likely to stimulate migration, insisting on an imperfect market theory as a 
generalized theoretical framework ignores the bulk of academic analyses of 
migration/mobility and development over many decades (see Rigg 2007 for a summary). At 
least three central characteristics of migration dynamics are suppressed. First, most 
potential migrants weigh a number of different aspects of their lives, not least their family 
circumstances when making the decision of moving or staying put. Second, most people, 
especially in the global South, are part of a bigger decision-making unit, notably their 
households. Decisions that are ‘rational’ in a household context might be less logically 
coherent from an individual point of view. Third, family networks and networking are often 
decisive for giving direction and help to migrants when moving and settling.  
Returning to the means for supporting the ‘good’ migration and halting the ‘bad’ migration a 
delicate issue emerges: even if it is possible to encourage more people to move for 
economic reasons, is it possible to make the so-called non-economic migrants stay put? In 
the WDR09, lack of social investments notably in education and health, in peripheral areas 
provides the answer. However, if social investments prevent unskilled people from leaving 
their home in the periphery due to their ill health or lack of education, then deficiency of 
social services is likely to be the main reason why they move. The WDR09’s presentation of 
evidence is somewhat distorted.  
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A great deal of empirical evidence suggests, that increasing migration to urban areas in 
many regions of Africa and Asia is closely linked to the increasing sway of a youth culture 
amongst rural youth who choose to move to become ‘modern’ (Tranberg et al. 2008; Gough 
2008). Hence, local improvement of rural health services and better schooling might not 
compensate for the feeling of living in the periphery. Young people may not want to wait until 
they have become ‘skilled’ through education in the rural context. And then there is the 
difficulty of delivering high quality education to the periphery in countries of the global South 
with no tradition for universal education. Hence, even where decentralized education 
facilities are being given investment priority, this is a long term strategy which in the short 
run may not succeed in preventing ambitious young people, usually supported by their 
parents, to seek opportunity in the city rather than staying put to achieve and apply their 
skills in the periphery. 
This brings us to a more fundamental doubt: is it only migration for agglomeration purposes 
in the modern sector that needs to be supported? While the division between ‘good’ and 
‘bad’ mobility fits well into the ideal two-sector model of factor mobility and agglomeration 
dynamics, it does not shed light and may even distort our understanding of how migration 
and mobility contribute to a growing number of households’ efforts to improve their 
livelihoods and living standards in the global South. As stated by the WDR09’s own main 
source on migration, Deshingkar and Grimm (2005), the spatial and temporal patterns of 
migration vary greatly by region. Migration to cities has increased considerably in recent 
years, but rural-to-rural migration in many countries of Asia and Africa still dominates. Rural-
to-rural migrants’ remittances and flexible migration practices provide a valuable safety net 
for many rural households and may ‘prevent’ an escalation of migration to city areas for the 
‘wrong reasons’. Hence, economic activities in the periphery do play an important role not 
only for migrants and rural incomes but also for national incomes. The WDR tends to 
overlook that the dynamic national economies in Southeast Asia, notably Thailand and 
Vietnam, base their success not only on attracting foreign capital and modern industrial 
investment, but also on developing rural employment opportunities and commercial 
agriculture (Agergaard 2009). Commercial agriculture is also of considerable importance in 
many African economies, not least pre-SAP, but also the mining sector (small-scale as well 
as large-scale) has proven to drive important non-metropolitan economic development 
(Bryceson and Yankson 2009). Hence, in situ or rural based urbanization, often highly 
stimulated by migrants and mobile livelihoods seems to be a parallel development path to 
the one led by urban agglomeration. 
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So while I acknowledge the WDR09’s emphasis on seeing migration as a societal benefit 
rather than an evil, I question the usefulness of seeing migration and economic activities 
from such a dualistic perspective, depicting the so-called peripheries as labour reserves 
while supporting economic activities in the centres of population agglomeration. In taking this 
exceptionally old-fashioned dichotomized view of rural and urban areas, the inference 
seems to be that economic development in the global South is only possible if reproduction 
costs (supporting children, mothers, disabled and old persons) are left to the rural areas? 
Where are the linkages between ‘traditional’ rural and ‘modern’ urban economic activities 
impacting on employment and regional and urban growth? Hence, I would argue that the 
links between urbanization and migration consist of much more than knowledge spillovers 
for the benefit of a progressive modern (industrialized) sector. 
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